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INTRODUCTION 
 The growth prospects of individual post-socialist economies are to a great extent 
constrained by their ability to transform inherited technological capacities from the 
period of closed economy into assets in the market economy context. In terms of analysis 
this transformation cannot be reduced on marketisation of old capabilities. Capabilities 
exist in an institutional context which have to be restructured and in this process market 
failures become pervasive. The main locus of R&D capabilities in the socialist systems 
was not in industry but in the 'science and scientific services' sector or R&D institutes. 
The R&D system itself was over extended because of its closed character and its isolation 
from industry. Under the new market conditions a deep restructuring is therefore 
inevitable. How successfully R&D organisations restructure will have an impact on the 
growth prospects of many sectors and on the economy as a whole.  
  
 Elsewhere (see Radosevic, 1994, 1996) we analysed the broader facets of this 
process within a national systems of innovation perspective which are appearing between, 
on the one hand, the inevitable dismantling and restructuring  of parts of the R&D, and on 
the other hand, the erosion of R&D capacities which would otherwise be viable in a 
market economy context. Here the focus is on the R&D system and especially on its main 
micro subject - industrial R&D institutes.  
 From this, still  very rudimentary, analysis we try to provide answers to the 
following: What are the basic restructuring processes taking place in R&D institutes in 
economies in transition? Based on these micro processes, is it possible to envisage some 
nationally specific patterns of R&D restructuring? Do these restructuring processes 
indicate convergence with or divergence from the basic organisational features of R&D 
in market economies? What are the likely patterns of restructuring of academy-industry 
links in post-socialist economies1?  
 
The answers to these questions are not yet definite but we hope that at least we may have 
generated useful hypotheses. We argue that the transition has not brought about the 
integration of previously separated R&D institutes into industry, which would have been 
the best option from an economic point of view. Instead several other processes seem to 
dominate of which conversion of R&D institutes into production or service enterprises is 
                                                 
1Here we use the term 'academy - industry' links which does not refer to Academy of Sciences but denotes 
all non 'in-house' R&D organisations. 
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very common. The processes involved in the transformation of R&D have generated 
several quite peculiar phenomena (diversification of R&D institutes, spontaneous 
privatisation, quasi-spin-offs) which we consider to be temporary before the systems 
settle within the basic features of R&D similar to those in market economies. While from 
the institutional side the ultimate states may appear similar, the actual transformation 
processes are very much nationally specific and their outcomes will have qualitatively 
different effects on the role of R&D  in the growth  of  individual economies.   
 
In the first section of the paper we set the stage for the analysis by outlining the main 
institutional features of the old system and, by interpreting them from an economics of  
R&D viewpoint. Based on several recent contributions from other colleagues, and my 
own research and consultancy work in eastern Europe, the different patterns in R&D 
restructuring and their link to micro responses are analysed. Micro adjustment processes 
are analysed in the third section. In the section four we evaluate the current academy-
industry relations in eastern Europe as well as their likely future developments. 
 
 
1. ECONOMICS OF R&D AND SOCIALIST HERITAGE IN RETROSPECT  
 
 The restructuring of R&D systems in post-socialist economies is handicapped by 
its past role which must be taken into account if we are to understand its current crisis.  
We briefly outline some of the characteristics of the Soviet R&D model which 
dominated, albeit to different degrees, in all countries of central and eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. The orthodox Soviet model was transformed in the 1970s and 
especially in the 1980s2. However, its basic features have been present throughout the 
socialist period.  
 
First, the ex-socialist economy must be considered as one large complex entrerprise 
where individual enterprises did not exist as business units but only as production units. 
The marketing function was dislocated to the Ministry for planning, the export function 
to the foreign trade organisation, the finance function to the Ministry of finance, and 
R&D function to R&D institutes which most often were not integrated into enterprises. 
Enterprises were production units with not only dislocated R&D but also engineering, 
design and technical  problem solving activities. These, together with production of  
specialised parts and components, were dislocated to industrial institutes which were 
                                                 
2By re-organising the economy into combinates (associations of vertically integrated enterprises which also  
include R&D institutes) an attempt was made to link R&D with the production units. Moreover, with the 
worsening of the economic situation R&D organisations were given independence in making contracts with 
other enterprises although funding was for some time still coming from the responsible ministry or from 
obligatory R&D expenditures imposed on enterprises. This created a technology  'quasi market' where 
technology assumed the role of the commodity to be exchanged on it. However, treating technology as a 
commodity did not solve any of the underlying structural problems of the Soviet model. In fact, the 
treatment of technology as a commodity which can be easily transferred into production is quite compatible 
with the Soviet R&D model (see Hanson and Pavitt, 1987). Combined with the lack of incentive to 
appropriate the results of R&D this led to technological lagging and often deterioration. 
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conglomerations of all these different activities. Although R&D systems in socialist 
economies were very much oriented towards the needs of industry they were not 
organisations in industry but for industry3 (see Radosevic, 1994). R&D was externalised 
and treated as a separate activity with enterprises seen as passive recipients of 'R&D 
achievements ready for implementation' previously developed by the R&D institutes4. 
The neglect of the role of  enterprises as a source of technology and emphasis on 
extramural R&D were at the root of the problems of R&D in the socialist system. 
 
Second, as the socialist economies were closed economies their R&D systems had to 
compensate for this through extensive imitative and 're-invention of the wheel' type 
technological effort. In addition, R&D systems were strongly oriented towards military 
objectives which further reduced their contribution to the economy and R&D was 
oversized in relation to comparative market economies. Elsewhere (Radosevic, 1995b) 
we show the degree to which the R&D systems in these countries were oversized in 
relation to comparable groups of countries. The specific economic system also influenced 
the type of R&D and technological effort. Product development dominated over R&D 
and over technological effort which focused on process technologies, cost reductions and 
organisational efficiency. 
 
Third, the productivity of the R&D system, especially in civilian sectors, was very low 
due to weak incentives in the system and administrative co-ordination mechanisms. This 
was not so much the case in the military sector where technical performance was all-
important and the Ministry of Defence was in control of the whole chain. However, in the 
civil sector the system was unable to cope with rapid changes in technology which 
became very obvious with the advent of microelectronics. Although R&D systems in 
terms of manpower and funding were in the main oriented towards industry the 
organisational set up and weak incentives in the system led to mainly intermediate type of 
R&D outputs, like technical documentation, prototypes and research. Implementation of  
innovations was slow and inefficient and user specifications and requirements did not 
play an important role. Problems in implementation were ignored and preference was 
given to new product developments to the stage where they were still far from being 
implementable.  
 
                                                 
3This distinction is important also for a further understanding of this chapter. Therefore, in the text we use 
the term 'industrial institutes' which is different from 'business R&D'. In this latter case these are R&D 
departments of industrial enterprises. Industrial institutes are independent organisations that worked for 
several enterprises and some of them (central industrial institutes) served whole branches.  
4The degree of  externalisation of R&D has varied widely within socialist economies. For example, the 
degree of externalisation of R&D in the Czech Republic was not so anomalous when this country is 
grouped with countries of a similar level of development. The share of R&D manpower in  industry 
(enterprises) of 38.7% is at the bottom end when compared with the OECD countries. However, it is still 
above countries such as  Turkey (36.2/1986), Portugal (16.6/1989), Ireland (19.5/1990), Greece 
(19.8/1989). The only country in the group of less developed EC countries whose share of industrial R&D 
personnel in total  is higher than in Czech Republic is Spain (43.9/1990). The EC average is 58.0% 
(1989).(Source for the Czech figure is Muller, 1995; for OECD 'Main S&T Indicators 1995')  
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 These typical features of the socialist system are currently changing as post-
socialist economies progress in the development of their own specific type of market 
economy. Some of the basic technological features of the market economy will then 
apply to them as well. The most important change is the recognition that technology is a 
firm-specific capability embodied in organisational routines and firm competencies. 
Elements of technology, like patents and information, can be traded but by themselves do 
not ensure technological capability. Technology is irreducible to a commodity and hence 
there are high limits to its transferability. Historical analysis shows that R&D and 
technology capability grew most rapidly within the firm and to a much lesser extent in 
extramural institutions (independent R&D centres, universities) (Mowery, 1983). The 
more firms compete on the basis of their ability to innovate the more they tend to 
internalise R&D in order to capture the gains that accrue from innovation. The main 
driving forces of new eastern European capitalism, as of any other market economy, are 
enterprises which are the only agents able to transform technology into products 
(Tunzelmann, 1995). There was much technology outputs in socialist economies, 
especially within industrial R&D institutes, which were not transformed into products but 
remained in its intermediate form of design, prototypes and technical documentation. 
However prolific these outputs by themselves do not create technological capability 
which can be developed only within the enterprises. The market for many types of R&D 
services is relatively small and the cost of contracting in such activities rather than doing 
them 'in-house' are huge. This reduces the R&D services market to only those areas 
where R&D can be separated from production and technology. For enterprises and for the 
R&D sector this means a change in perspective and radical restructuring in terms of mode 
of operation. 
 
 
On this basis we would expect that the transformation of R&D systems in post-socialist 
economies would develop in three directions.  
 
First, there would be a strengthening of the 'in-house' R&D capabilities of  business 
enterprises relative to the extramural R&D sector.  
 
Second, we would expect a restructuring of R&D systems in terms of downsizing, and 
organisational restructuring and reorientation from product development toward process 
improvements and user requirements.  
 
Thirdly, the opening up of the economy would lead to much R&D being displaced by 
foreign products and technologies. Also, this opening would reorient demand in  R&D 
system and would bring new ways of integrating domestic R&D with foreign S&T.  
 
 
  
2. MACRO POLICIES AND MICRO RESPONSES: SHOCK VS GRADUALISM 
IN R&D RESTRUCTURING IN POST-SOCIALIST ECONOMIES 
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In this section we analyse the interaction of micro-macro responses and how jointly they 
create specific national patterns of restructuring. The analysis is simplified by using a 
matrix involving two basic criteria: first, the features of the dual regime of operation of 
R&D institutes, and, second the (non)existence of active restructuring policy focused 
towards micro level (R&D institute) (see matrix below). 
 
 
The dual regime of operation of R&D institutes in the 'gradualist' and 'shock' policy 
versions  
 
R&D institutes in post-socialist economies operate under two different regimes: the 
market regime of direct contracts for R&D and the non-market regime of public funding 
for R&D. While their responses are also shaped by their internally developed strategies it 
is these two exogenous groups of factors that influence very much the way they adjust. 
(For example, Wolf (1995) in his analysis of responses of ex-institutes of eastern German 
Academy argues that the exogenous factors have been by far the most dominant in the 
restructuring outcomes of institutes.) Elements of the dual regime under which they 
operate are summarised in the table below. 
 
 
Table 1 
Elements of the dual regime of operation of RD institutes in post-socialist economies 
 
Market for R&D contracts, services 
and products 
Public funding of R&D 
Degree of competition (monopoly vs. 
new domestic private and foreign 
competitors) 
Funding criteria (project vs. institutional 
financing) 
Structure of demand (big vs. small 
firms) 
Evaluation procedures (peer review vs. 
negotiations) 
Quality of demand (export vs. domestic 
orientation) 
Budgetary conditions  
 
 Restructuring responses of R&D institutes are influenced by the tightness and 
stringency of these two regimes.  
 In an economy where foreign investments are still relatively small, like in Russia, 
we may expect that the degree of competition will be different from the economy which 
is small and very open in terms of trade and investment. Progress in privatisation changes 
the structure of enterprises towards smaller private enterprises which in turn alters the 
demand for R&D and technical services when compared with the old type of enterprises. 
Export sectors are often the only remaining pockets of effective demand for R&D in post-
socialist economies.  The structure of demand for R&D is different depending on whether 
exporting sectors are commodity producers or capital goods and machinery producers. 
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 Criteria for public funding, evaluation procedures and the general budgetary 
conditions, strongly influence the degree to which R&D institutes are moving towards the 
market. In the majority of post-socialist economies, competitive bidding procedures are 
introduced to some degree. However, the differences between countries in this respect are 
noticeable. For example, in Russia, the Ukraine and Romania competitive bidding is still 
marginal5. Even though the nominal criteria may support competitive bidding there are 
big differences in the evaluation procedure. In some countries the system is based on 
peer-review with independent evaluators while in others it is still more a system of 
negotiation with authorities and per capita finance. Also, the budgetary positions of  
public R&D differ significantly depending whether there is a strong lobby for science or 
its power is weak and in addition the general budgetary situation (budget deficit or 
surplus) plays a role. 
 On this basis it is possible to distinguish between countries that have pursued 
sudden and very sharp change in the rules of public funding and those where the rules of 
public funding are the same as in socialist times6. This is especially noticeable in relation 
to industrial institutes where their predominantly public funding in new market 
conditions is considered as incompatible with market economy principles. The argument 
is that industrial R&D should be the responsibility of industry and should be left to the 
market. In economies where demand for R&D collapsed almost overnight any drastic 
reduction in funding for industrial R&D means, as Ivanova (1995) put it, 'shock without 
therapy'. Opposite to this is the gradualist policy of slow changing of public funding 
criteria.  
 
Micro restructuring policies 
 
 Another important factor which determines the micro response is the existence or 
otherwise micro restructuring policies in the R&D system, in other words whether the 
responsible ministries have undertaken explicit activities on evaluation of R&D institutes 
and their restructuring in terms of privatisation, splitting, liquidation, or conversion.  This 
active or direct restructuring may also involve a transformation into cost/profit centres, 
strategic business units or investments. In this case the restructuring organisations is 
explicitly addressed as a policy issue. Since almost all R&D institutes are initially under 
state ownership active restructuring by their nominal owner usually the State Ownership 
Fund, Privatisation Fund or industrial ministry or Ministry of S&T is required. Active 
restructuring also provides a necessary element of therapy in the new situation in which 
R&D institutes in these economies suddenly find themselves. If such explicit micro 
policy is absent institutes respond by passive adjustments some of which are discussed 
later on in the paper. 
Passive or indirect restructuring is the creation of an environment in which institutes  
restructure themselves by submitting to hard budget constraints, and/or exposing 
                                                 
5In Russia the Foundation for Basic Research has been set up which is based on competitive bidding 
procedures. However, it disburses only 3% of government R&D funding. (see Ivanova, 1996.)  
6Characteristics of different national markets for R&D should be also taken into account. However, we lack 
any systematic information on this. 
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themselves to competition and to the threat of bankruptcy. In the case of R&D institutes 
there is ample room for this type of restructuring through making priorities in funding 
policy or by cutting funding for their activities.  
 
 
Different national patterns of restructuring 
 
 Using these two criteria - the degree of shock or gradualism in public funding and 
the (non) existence of active micro restructuring policy - we can distinguish several 
different national situations. These are, inevitably, very rough simplifications as our 
objective is not to describe fully the specific national context but to illustrate the diversity 
of national responses and the underlying factors behind them. 
 
 
(Insert matrix about here) 
 
Contrasting national patterns of restructuring 
 
Chart 1 
 
Eastern Germany
Czech R.
Slovakia
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Russia
Bulgaria
National patterns of R&D restructuring in post-socialist economies
Ukraine
Moldova
Estonia
Lithuania
Latvia
Slovenia
Belarus
Active restructuring
'Gradualism''Shock'
Passive restructuring  
 
 
 
Shock without therapy' 
The Czech government rejected any structural policy toward the microeconomic level 
within the R&D system (See Schneider, 1996). It abruptly withdrew financial support to 
the majority of industrial institutes. Since 1991, industrial companies in the Czech 
Republic have had to finance their  R&D activities themselves. Industrial institutes 
suddenly lost a relatively secure income and had to find means for survival. Also, under 
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the process of privatisation R&D institutes were treated as 'normal' production 
enterprises. This 'shock therapy' led a to massive conversion of their activities to services 
and production.  
 
'Shock with therapy' 
Germany may seem from one perspective to be an exemplar of shock therapy in R&D 
taking into account the speed and scale of reduction of its eastern German R&D system. 
However, the analysis shows that government gave generous subsidies followed by 
evaluation of individual institutions on which basis they were then restructured. (see 
Schneider, 1995 for detailed account). Over a very short period, restructuring of all R&D 
institutes in eastern Germany was enabled by the available administrative capabilities and 
finance. 
 
'Gradualism with some therapy' 
The Polish government also pursued (or at least attempted to pursue) a policy of 
restructuring but in a gradual manner. It changed the principles of public funding of R&D 
by ranking R&D institutes based on their direct, however imperfect, individual 
assessment  (Jasinski, 1994). However, a number of R&D institutions as well as large 
number of industrial institutes are still on, perhaps low, but statutory subsidies which 
indicate this gradualist policy (see Jablecka, 1995). 
 
'Gradualism without therapy' 
Russia and Romania are good examples of gradualism in R&D. Institutional financing in 
these countries is still dominant and there is no systematic policy or attempt to restructure 
the R&D system. In both countries the slogan of 'salvation of national science' was taken 
as cover for saving jobs in R&D sector7. 
In Romania the Ministry of S&T still negotiates research 'themes' with the R&D 
institutes. It also has set up funding to 'transfer' the technology once it has been 
developed by R&D institutes. This shows that in Romania the Soviet R&D model is still 
present in some elements. Although in Russia the Ministry of Science and Technological 
Policy officially has abandoned the policy of 'science salvation' and initiated prioritisation 
in funding and differentiation among institutes by granting to 60 of them the status of 
State Scientific Centre this is still a gradual change which only prevented full erosion of 
these institutions (see Gaponenko, 1995). 
 
'Shock and gradualism without therapy' 
The case of  Hungary does not fall clearly within our matrix as the government's 
inconsistent policies actually resulted in a combination of shock therapy and gradualism. 
By the end of the eighties institutes were operating under tight funding conditions where 
funding was available only through loans for innovation development and not for project 
funding. By 1992 Hungary began an evaluation of  industrial institutes which was not 
followed a policy of restructuring in any systematic direction (see Mosoni-Fried, 1995; 
                                                 
7In Romania current policy of gradualism was strongly shaped by the trade union pressure and street 
demonstration of workers in  R&D sector.  
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Balazs, 1994). The outcome has been deterioration and collapse of the network of 
industrial institutes beacuse of prolonged and unsystematic attempts to restructure them.   
 
 
Assessing national patterns 
 
How can we evaluate these different national patterns? Are some of better than others? 
Which factors should be taken into account when assessing them? There are two issues 
which should be used as criteria in assessing these patterns.  
  
First, countries differ significantly in their administrative capacities to implement change 
and especially active restructuring. Policy disasters do not come from decisions about 
whether to become actively involved or not but from state activities incommensurate with 
its implementation capacity. The problem is one of how to formulate policy 
commensurate with the administrative capability to implement it. For example, individual 
privatisation of R&D institutes means that boundaries must be drawn over which 
activities should be private and which public or semi-public in each particular case 
(Webster, 1989). This requires administrative skills beyond those available in post-
socialist economies. Only the 
eastern German rapid restructuring of R&D was commensurate with the available 
administrative capacities for such change.  Also, the radical reduction in financing 
industrial R&D in Czech Republic was commensurate with that country's low capability 
to implement state led restructuring policy. The gradualism of Russia and Romania 
requires better restructuring policy and administrative capacity to implement it than is 
available. In the absence of such capacity there is erosion within R&D institutes which 
only nominally remain institutions they used to be but in reality are often deserted. 
Restructuring is especially complex in the case of inter-organisational restructuring as 
this requires the wider consensus of several actors which is very difficult to achieve in the 
fluid institutional system of today  in post-socialist economies. Typical are non-profit 
making R&D centres or research associations, which are still very rare in eastern Europe 
as they require the establishment of a new organisation based on consensus, and interest 
from several enterprises and public bodies. Only in eastern Germany was this a real 
option (see table 4) pursued through the Treuhandanstalt model of privatisation of R&D 
institutes (see Schneider, 1995). The setting up a network of R&D centres based on the 
Fraunhofer society model in Hungary (Zoltan Bay institutes) shows all difficulties of 
such institutional transformation.  
 
Second, S&T policy practitioners often point out that the advantage of gradualism is that 
it enables R&D professionals to remain specialised in areas where they have developed 
their competencies, i.e. they do not move to non-R&D activities. Others maintain that it 
acts as a good subsidy until institutes can develop their own products which can be 
marketed and until they transform themselves into more competitive organisations. These 
arguments do not recognise the problem of cost-effectiveness, duration and the objectives 
of  subsidy 'dressed' as institutional finance for R&D. The system of financing should 
differentiate between subsidising commercialisation of R&D results and financing R&D 
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projects where scientific and technological relevance should be the dominant criteria. 
This form of hidden subsidy for product development is not the most effective way to 
convert R&D institutes into production or service companies. The effect of subsidies 
distributed as en bloc institutional finance may be to destroy good research without 
making industrial producers or service providers competitive. Finally, the conversion into 
marketable products or services can be done in-house within R&D institute only in 
certain sectors. The most common cases in post-socialist economies are institutes in 
information technology which are trying to turn their R&D results in saleable customised 
software. However, in many other sectors R&D results cannot be converted to products 
within R&D institutes (as they quite simply require additional facilities and equipment) 
or marketable applications are not feasible due to the character of the research. 
 
To sum up, whether policy should be in the direction of active or passive restructuring, 
gradual or radical reduction in public funding, should be assessed in the context of policy 
capability or lack of restructuring capacity. In cases where policy capability is lacking the 
costs of gradualism could be very high in terms of erosion of R&D and prevention of the 
restructuring which would otherwise have occured. In such cases the option is rapid 
privatisation of industrial R&D activities. Effective policy is that which aims at 
supporting activities (projects) and not institutions per se. Too often in post-socialist 
economies policy makers try to pursue too many objectives with too little management 
capacity and finance. For example, governments like Hungarian want to only partially 
privatise R&D institutes in order to ensure that they retain control over their activities, 
but are not able to ensure that institutions retain their core activities (see Mosoni-Fried, 
1995).  
 
 
 
3. MICRO ADJUSTMENT PROCESSES  
 
This section outlines several characteristic adjustment processes at the level of R&D 
institutes common to post-socialist economies. These should be seen in the context of 
macro policies discussed in the previous section and taking into account how these R&D 
institutes were organised in the socialist period. 
 
 
3.1. The emerging adjustment outcomes  
 
R&D institutes in the socialist period were conglomerate type of organisations which 
combined R&D with other activities like micro-production, services and engineering. 
Even if we use an example of  one of the least-Soviet like R&D systems - that of ex-
Yugoslavia - we still find a significant combination of R&D, production and services. For 
example, in Croatian R&D system in 1989 52% of  total revenue was came from 
research, 37% from production and 11% from services (Radosevic, 1992). In other 
countries, where the definition of R&D was even broader, this mix was more 
pronounced. Such institutes which were conglomerations of different activities were a 
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form of  organisation in the context of the socialist economy (see section 1). Their 
emphasis was on product development and servicing enterprises within a branch and 
micro-production and they compensate for the lack of specialised suppliers in the 
economy.  
In the post-socialist period we might expect that these conglomerates will be transformed 
into four different types of organisation within which activities are more coherent (see 
table 2). This need for unbundling of R&D institutes is confirmed in the case of the 
institutes of the former eastern Germany Academy of  which 47% had to disintegrate into 
separate activities (see table 3).  
 
 
Table 2:  
Transformation of  conglomerate based industrial institutes into market-based 
organisational forms 
 
Socialist R&D institutes: 
activities 
Post-socialist transitory 
phenomena 
Market-economy 
organisational forms 
1. Research 
2. Designs and proto-types 
3. Engineering and 
technical services 
4. S&T information 
5. Micro production 
- Temporary diversification 
- Spontaneous privatisation 
- Quasi-spin-offs 
 
1. Dominantly public 
research institutes 
2. Profit based production 
or service enterprise 
3. R&D company  
4. Non-profit R&D centre 
(research association) 
5. Liquidation 
 
 
Table 3: 
Evaluation outcomes for the institutes of the ex-eastern German Academy 
 
Outcome Percentage 
Disintegration 47% 
Conversion 35% 
Liquidation 10% 
Integration 9% 
         Source: Wolf (1995) 
 
 
The available, sparse evidence indicates that the most common transformation path might 
be the transformation of R&D institutes into manufacturing or service enterprises. Instead 
of relocating R&D groups to industrial enterprises, R&D institutes are turning themselves 
into commercially oriented enterprises not necessarily based on the old core activities. 
Schneider (1994) gives figures on restructuring outcomes of industrial institutes in 
eastern Germany which confirm this (Table 4). 
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Table 3 
Restructuring of 103 eastern German 'Research  Plc' 
 
 Number 
Transformation into production or service enterprises 
through privatisation 
52 
R&D institute remain integrated with its now privatised 
mother company 
1 
Transformation of R&D institutes into research associations 
through 'Treuhandanstalt' model of privatisation (20), or into 
regional institutes (5) 
25* 
Liquidation 25 
* In almost every case a commercial part had been spun off before transformation 
Source: Schneider, 1995, p. 11 
 
A very rare outcome is the integration of R&D institutes into industrial enterprises - the 
option which would be most favourable for technological development. Why should  
transformation into industrial or service enterprise be prevalent and why is integration 
into industrial enterprisess so rare? In section 1 we pointed out that technology is a firm-
specific which means that the people involved in technology oriented R&D are usually 
familiar with the technology and thus in the best position to develop R&D into 
commercial products or services. On the other hand, the problem involved in integrating 
externalised R&D groups that were working for industrial enterprises are a result not only 
of the poor financial situations of these enterprises but also of the significant change in 
the demand for R&D and technology which cannot be met by domestic R&D institutes. 
In other words. the mismatch between old supply and new demand makes massive 
integration of R&D groups into manufacturing enterprises  unlikely. This has important 
implications for the nature of Academy - industry relations which we discuss in section 4.  
  
 
3.2. Post-socialist transitory R&D micro phenomena 
 
We have noted several transitory phenomena in R&D institutes which are a part and a 
reflection of patterns of adjustment described in the second section. These are: 
diversification of the activities of R&D institutes; spontaneous privatisation and, related 
to this the phenomenon of quasi-spin offs. This phenomenon, an adjustment response at 
the level of R&D institutes, should be interpreted as a manifestation of the transition 
crisis rather than a sustainable restructuring path. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1. Temporary diversification 
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The conglomerate type of R&D organisation has not totally disappeared in post-socialist 
economies. Further diversification of an institute's activities  is a temporary strategy to 
overcome the enormous uncertainties and financial difficulties which it faces. This 
diversification, which was normal in the socialist context,  today creates serious problems 
in managing very disparate sets of activities, with very different objectives and 
underlying ideologies. Institutes have become even more hybridised than during socialist 
times which creates huge problems in terms of their organisational coherence and 
especially in terms of defining organisational values, objectives, competencies and 
financial management. (see Radosevic, 1994).  
However, the difference between the present diversification and the former socialist 
diversification is that today this diversification is primarily in terms of products, 
services and markets. In terms of technologies and competencies institutes have had 
to focus much more since a wide range of inherited competencies is not competitive 
or technologically up to date in the newly open and cost sensitive business 
environment. Pressure to specialise faces strategic uncertainties regarding the pace 
and area of specialisation. Also, today's diversification is managed quite differently. 
Instead of integrated and bureaucratic organisations present-day institutes are 
usually organised through profit/cost centres or strategic business units8. The scale 
of this reorganisation can be illustrated by the transformation of large Russian 
research institutes into smaller research centres leading to an increase of 36% in the 
number of scientific organisations within the Russian Academy of Sciences in the 
three years 1990-1992 (Gaponenko, 1995, p. 170). 
These smaller, coherent R&D groups must take responsibility for their own survival 
and prosperity resulting in stream-lining of overheads, reduction in auxiliary 
personnel and full responsibility for technical and financial elements of contracts. 
The consequence is a very disparate financial situation across different groups and 
the appearance of a new problem: the inability of boards to strategically manage 
business portfolios since the possibilities for cross-subsidisation and synergies are 
restricted or impossible. While in the medium term cost efficiency and flexibility 
have improved, in the long-term the possibilities for developing a knowledge base 
and expanding into new areas, are limited.  
With the stabilisation of their environment, diversification of R&D institutes, 
encompassing any production and service activity which may bring income, become an 
unsustainable organisational form. Newly restructured R&D organisations will be more 
focused or coherently diversified9. Their profiles should fit with one of the organisational 
forms in table 2. 
 
 
                                                 
8A good example of this shift is the institute in Romania visited by the author which has 400 employees 
and is organised into 77 profit centres which are entirely responsible for their income. This was pointed out 
by the director in the following way: 'I can move people among these groups but there is no way that I can 
move money among them'. 
9For the notion and analysis of corporate coherence see Teece et al  (1994). 
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3.2.2. Spontaneous privatisation by individuals 
 
The need for researchers and engineers to survive in new conditions, combined with the 
poor property rights, led to different forms of spontaneous privatisation or massive 
implementation of  individual strategies of survival which can be interpreted as 
spontaneous privatisation. The more uncertainty there is regarding the future status of 
organisations and the greater the lack of clearly defined property rights, the more 
widespread is spontaneous privatisation.  In an analysis of spontaneous privatisation in 
the Russian R&D system Tambovstev (1995) shows that spontaneous privatisation is less 
pervasive in organisational forms with better defined property rights (joint-stock 
company; lease-hold) than in those in which they are poorly defined (state-owned 
specialised institutes and academic institutes).   
In spontaneous privatisation, control rights and cash flow rights get entirely separated.  
Control rights are all rights about how to take decisions about using the assets. Cash flow 
rights are the rights to earn benefits and pay costs that result from a particular use of the 
asset. The ownership structure becomes inefficient when control rights are dissociated 
from cash flow rights. (For a discussion on this in the case of Russia see Boycko, M., A. 
Schleifer and R. Vishny , 1995.) 
The nominal owners of R&D institutes - usually State Ownership Fund and/or 
Privatisation Fund(s) - decide on their control rights while the Ministry of S&T, as the 
major client of R&D institutes, is the main controller of their cash flow10. Control of  
cash flow rights is divided between the Ministry of S&T and employees where 
management has rights to make direct contracts on domestic market. The control rights 
remain with State Ownership Fund and Privatisation Fund. The longer this continues the 
more negative are its consequences for R&D institutes through uncertainties as to the 
direction of restructuring, outflow of people, etc. In the case of fast privatisation, changes 
in  control rights would prevent the appropriation of cash flow rights. 
 
 
Table 5 
Percentage of workers generating extra income in the workplace without official 
registration but with implicit approval of management 
 
 The rate of phenomenon occurrence, % 
Organisation status low (0-15) middle (16-50) high (more than 50) 
State-owned    
specialised  39 33 22 
academic 29 45 28 
lease-hold 75 25 - 
                                                 
10Here we have to abstract different privatisation types in post-socialist economies. Full analysis would 
require a separate paper. 
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Joint-stock 
company of the 
open type 
50 46 4 
Source: Tambovtsev V.L. (1995) 
 
Laure-Couderc (1995), based on cases of several Russian institutes, indicates the 
existence of a practice where employees use the intellectual stock of institute and 
commercialise it on an individual basis11. Such practice is impossible without some sort 
of agreement between management and researchers. Tambovtsev (1995) argues that the 
basis of this is an informal contract between the institute's administration and the 
researchers: in order to retain them administration allows researchers to carry out 
spontaneous privatisation of equipment and intellectual property in exchange for 
obtaining a guarantee that management 'can retain their positions and can participate in 
gaining incomes from the spontaneous privatisation of the immovable property of the 
institute' (p. 328). 
 
3.2.3. Quasi-spin-offs 
 
The spin-off is usually defined as a new organisation set up by the parent organisation in 
order to resolve its organisational incoherence by developing and commercialising 
activities which are not parts of its current core but which may become so in the future or 
may remain as independent activities. In the context of post-socialist R&D institutes spin-
offs provide a way to achieve a more focused organisation by spinning-off purely 
commercial activities and preserving the R&D profile of the institute.  Indeed, the 
number of small firms attached to R&D institutes in post-socialist countries is relatively 
high. For example, in 1993 there were 12,000 small enterprises in the Russian R&D 
sector of  which 513 were within the Russian Academy (see Gaponenko, 1995, p. 17). In 
the case of the Ukraine, in 1993 there were 400 small firms around the Academy of 
Sciences (Issakova and Klochko, 1994). Balazs (1994) is an interesting account of the 
phenomenon of small firms around the Technical University of Budapest. 
However, deeper insights into the nature of these spin-offs provide a more complex 
picture in terms of their relationships the with parent company as well as in terms of the 
factors which shape this relationship. 
As pointed out by Balazs (1996) the majority of these firms are in the area of services 
like consultancy, technical assistance, trade and distribution. Very few are 
commercialising accumulated R&D results through new products, although in the past 
product development and design was their main activity. In economies where services in 
general were extremely undeveloped these firms could be considered to be the potential 
future nodes of technical and related services which are lacking. In accordance with this 
Balazs (1996) argues that these forms play a useful role as a part of the domestic 
'knowledge industry'. In cases where they are spin-offs of parent companies, and where 
they complement the activities of R&D institutes, they may be new actors in the R&D 
                                                 
11This is particularly widespread in institutes in 'soft' areas like information sciences, and software where 
the distinction between assets and merchandise is not clear (see Laure-Couderc, 1995). 
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system and in industry. However, privatisation, crisis conditions and slow, mainly 
spontaneous restructuring of R&D institutes, create very specific, post-socialist forms of 
spin-offs which are better described as quasi spin-offs. 
A new, quasi spin-off firm, is usually a joint-stock company which has, in different 
degrees, developed links with its parent institution but never fully spun-off12. Often 
(co)ownership of the new company is coupled with arrangements where core 
employees of parent company work on a part-time basis for the new company. In the 
conditions where privatisation is in turmoil and the legal framework is changing this 
link enables the transfer of resources, knowledge and people from a public 
organisation to a semi-public or private organisation. Whether in a quasi spin-off 
relationship, the knowledge assets of both organisations increase, are stripped-off or 
merely transferred from parent to spin-off company, are issues which need more 
systematic research. A rare piece of evidence on this is Tambovtsev (1995) who, 
based on a sample of 130 institutes, found that about 48% of them had small firms 
specialised in the institutes' line of research. About 39% of them had small 
enterprises not specialised in their line of activity and these were in general purely 
commercial enterprises13. The presence of these enterprises is not systematically 
linked with the characteristics of the R&D institute. A similar number of small firms 
in institutes with different levels of demand for their activities indicates that attached 
small firms are primarily a reflection of crisis and the search for new growth 
opportunities, and not of the growth itself. They allow personnel to compensate for 
the decrease in their living standards but not in a decisive way (Tambovstev, 1995, 
p. 326). The fact that they remain in a sort of symbiotic relationships show that these 
are quasi spin-off firms.  
 
 
 
4. RESTRUCTURING OF ACADEMY-INDUSTRY LINKS IN POST-SOCIALIST 
ECONOMIES14 
 
Academy-industry links have been seen in the immediate period after 1989 as a magic 
formula for commercialising accumulated R&D capabilities and the whole oversized 
R&D sector. This shift was a continuation of  the initiatives undertaken in several 
socialist countries during the 1980s when R&D systems were forced to become more 
commerically viable (For Bulgaria see Simeonova, 1995; for Hungary see Balazs, 1994; 
for Russia see Orel et al, 1995, p. 310-311.) However, after 1989 the market and the 
whole economic environment radically changed which makes the response through 
strengthening academy - industry links inadequate. Its limitations are:  
                                                 
12An extreme version of 'quasi spin offs' is a firm which is only formally, but not in any other sense spun 
off.  R&D institute and firm are in symbiotic relationship where the firm serves to increase the personal 
income of researchers and keep the public image of institute 'clean'.  (see Balazs, 1994, p.17). 
13Laure-Couderc (1995) reports on the case of the Russian design institute which founded a bank as its 
spin-off activity.  
14See footnote 1. 
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First, academy-industry links cannot be a solution for all R&D areas. In some areas 
'technological distance' between R&D area and local industry is great and bridging 
mechanisms are undeveloped. In table 6 we show how the intensity of interaction varies 
with the profile the of R&D institutes. 
 
 
Table 6 
Frequency and intensity of Academy - industry links on the sample of 10 Croatian R&D 
institutions 
 
Type of 
institutions 
Independent 
institutes in 
basic science 
Applied 
science 
faculties 
Industrial R&D 
institutes 
Average 
frequency of links 
2.5 9.3 8.4 
 
Forms of 
interaction 
Short-term 
projects 
Long-term 
projects 
Consulting Informal 
knowledge 
transfers 
Education 
transfers 
Ministry 
projects 
Intensity 
of links 
21 4 12 17 9 13 
Source: Radosevic, S. (1992) Based on interviews by the author, March 1992. 
Note: Scaling is based on three level assessment of links (3=strong presence; 2=noticeable 
presence; 1=present on a modest scale) 
 
 
Second, types of interaction from the former system show the character of technology 
transfer market. These are mainly short-term projects and consultancy activities (see table 
6). Non-market links (informal knowledge transfers; education transfers) play an equally 
important role and, by definition, these cannot be pushed on to the market. The only 
systematic links are those through joint R&D projects between academic and industrial 
organisations, which were rare in most of socialist economies as business R&D was very 
limited. In summary, the market for bridging activities seems to be much smaller than the 
initial expectations of countries that pushed R&D institutes to the market.  
 
Third, the new demand is not for packages derived from R&D, which, in Bulgarian 
statistics are termed as 'R&D results ready for implementation'. Simeonova (1994) shows 
that in the period 1990/93 there was a 46% decrease in this type of output. Putting this 
type of output in the market will only show up how inadequate is the old type of supply 
in the new conditions, especially since the value of the R&D contracts market is being 
sharply reduced. 
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These factors explain why bridging mechanisms which are common, at least to a certain 
extent, in all Western countries are rather limited in post-socialist economies. (See 
examples of this mechanisms in different post-socialist economies in Jasinski (1995) for 
Poland, Lenardic (1995) for Croatia, Simeonova (1995) for Bulgaria, Muller (1995) for 
Czech Republic, and, Sandu (1995) for Romania.) Agencies and associations for 
technology transfer are more institutions for lobbying and protecting group interests than 
actual mechanisms for supporting transfer. Technology parks are more 'renting agencies' 
than places for nurturing the growth of small firms. They cannot provide venture capital 
and are unable to provide or assist in acquiring loans from banks. In summary, the 
transfer of organisational models into a different institutional context has inevitably been 
transformed into something different from the original idea. 
 
 
So waht do the future academy-industry links in post-socialist economies look like? In 
their convergence towards a market economy some basic features of the economics of 
academy-industry relations will probably shape the future intensity of these links. Some 
of these  features (based on Mowery, 1983; 1990, Bell, 1996) are as follows:  
 
The supply of R&D services is determined by: 
1. Economies of scale and specialisation in providing R&D services. Independent R&D 
institutes should have advantages in routinized services, like testing, which cannot be 
fully exploited by 'in-house' R&D units. The knowledge provided is, in principle, of 
generic character, with little firm specificity, which reduces the problems of its 
transferability. These isolated (separable) aspects of firms operations are improvements 
rather than 'in-house' type of developments.  
 
2. The quality and complexity of R&D services are determined by the degree of 
interdependency between R&D and production. The greater the interdependence the 
lower the R&D unit costs due to cumulated experience in implementing new 
technologies. That is why firms are in fact the best source of technology and R&D 
services. This especially applies in the case of knowledge which is highly specialised and 
idiosyncratic.  
 
The level and the degree of  demand by industry for R&D services is influenced by: 
1. The absorption capability of users. The more sophisticated his 'in-house' R&D 
activities the more the user is able is to exploit R&D services provided. The better 
expertise he has to pose a feasible research problem (evaluate results) the more he is able 
to utilise the results of externally performed R&D. 
 
2. Contractual difficulties (transaction costs) in the case of complex and uncertain 
research projects. Large scale, more specific and the more complex R&D is more likely 
to be 'in-house' organised.  
 
 Taking into account these factors that determine supply and demand the range of 
market based services supplied by research organisations is limited, encompassing those 
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at the low risk end of the R&D spectrum. Where more complex R&D activities are 
supplied these function for enterprises (users) as complements, rather than as substitutes 
for their 'in house' research. The complementarity of contractual and 'in house' R&D is 
higher for the more complex (non-analysis) projects. In the case of simple R&D, like 
testing, the substitutability of these two categories is much higher. Mowery  (1983) 
shows that independent R&D organisations primarily serve firms that have 'in house' 
research facilities. The low risk projects, for which learning complementarities are less 
important are more prone to be contracted as substitutes. 
 
From this it follows that academy-industry links in post-socialist economies are strongly 
determined by the pace of building R&D within manufacturing and service firms (banks 
etc.). This also implies that academy-industry links will probably be focused more on the 
direction of strengthening 'in-house' R&D capabilities than on the transfer of R&D results 
from independent R&D institutes to manufacturing firms.  
 
In the post-socialist context it follows that the limited transfer of the technology available 
from the R&D institutes in post-socialist economies is the outcome of the following:   
a) Poor quality R&D which is to a great extent obsolete and needs restructuring;   
b) Low effective demand from industry which is strapped for cash, and still hindered by 
the market, privatisation and other legal uncertainties; 
c) Inherent difficulties in transferring technologies across inter-organisational boundaries 
limiting the role of  academy-industry technology transfers. As argued in the first section, 
due to the firm-specific character of technology, it is more likely that R&D institutes will 
be transformed into industrial enterprises or service enterprises than they will remain as a 
source of R&D which will then be marketed to industrial enterprises with relatively weak 
in-house R&D capabilities.  
 
The available empirical evidence confirms the limited role of the existing bridging 
institutions (associations, agencies, S&T parks). Similar to the whole R&D system  the 
bridging functions are undergoing a restructuring. They are distributed across institutions  
a different way to that of the socialist system. Under the socialist system bridging 
functions were the responsibility of several government authorities who actually managed 
technology transfer. In the market context, these functions become institutionalised 
within and among those organisations that produce technical knowledge (enterprises, 
universities, academies).  
 
Even more than in the case of  the flourishing academy-industry links we should expect 
that the whole R&D system will structurally change. In such a context intra-
organisational restructuring will dominate over the possibly stronger impact of 
technology transfer and bridging institutions15. The bridging functions will most likely 
become a  part of the newly restructured enterprises, universities, R&D service 
companies, industrial associations or R&D centres rather than being provided only by 
                                                 
15For the discussion on this in the context of  developing countries and its implications for transition 
economies see excellent contribution by Bell, 1996. 
Chapter in Webster, Andrew (ed):  Building New Bases for Innovation: The 
Transformation of the R&D System in Post-Socialist States, Anglia Polytechnic 
University, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 8-30. 
 
20 
institutions specialised in transfer services. In other words, we should expect the bridging 
function to develop much less often as a stand-alone function (Bell, 1996). Often it will 
be a complementary function of R&D institutions or enterprises. Bridging functions will 
be supported as a way to better understand clients/customers needs and requirements. If 
independent they would be mainly operating in the transfer of simple information like 
marketing information and/or would act as intermediating agencies by bringing 
organisational know-how through consultants which they can better do due to economies 
of scale in collecting information and networking. 
 
 
 
Literature 
 
Balazs, Katalin (1994) Transition Crisis in Hungary's R&D Sector, mimeo, Institute of 
Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, June 1994 
 
Balazs, Katalin (1994b) Small Firms in and around Academia (Hungarian Case Study), 
Institute of Economics, (Project: Innovation Potential Embodied in the Changing 
Academy - Industry Relations, Central European University)   
 
Balazs, Katalin (1995) 'Innovation Potential Embodied in Research Organisations in 
Central in Eastern Europe', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, EASST Special Issue 
 
Balazs, Katalin (1996) Academic Entreprenurship and their Role in 'Knowledge' transfer, 
STEEP Working Paper, SPRU, forthcoming. 
 
Bell, Martin (1996) 'Technology transfer to transition countries: Are there lessons from 
the experience of the post-war industrialising countries?' In Dyker, David (ed.) 
Technology in Transition, Central European University Press, forthcoming  
 
Boycko, M., A. Schleifer and R. Vishny (1995) Privatising Russia, The MIT Press, 1995 
 
Gaponenko, Nadezhda (1995) 'Transformation of the Research System in a Transitional 
Society: The Case of Russia', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, EASST Special Issue 
 
Hanson, P. and Pavitt, K. (1987): The Comparative Economics of Research, Development 
and Innovation in East and West: a Survey, Chur, Harwood Academic Publishers. 
 
Issakova, Nina and Yuri A. Klochko (1994) Small Innovation Enterprises in the Academy 
of  Sciences of Ukraine, Paper presented to the Conference on Science, Technology and 
Change: New Theories, Realities, Institutions, EASST, Budapest, August  28-31, 1994. 
 
Ivanova, Natalia (1995) Russian Research and Development, Stockholm Institute of East 
European Economics, Working Paper, January, No. 105. 
Chapter in Webster, Andrew (ed):  Building New Bases for Innovation: The 
Transformation of the R&D System in Post-Socialist States, Anglia Polytechnic 
University, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 8-30. 
 
21 
 
Ivanova, Natalia (1996) Institutional Innovation in Russian Science, Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, 
Moscow, mimeo 
 
Jablecka, Julita (1995) 'Changes in the Management and Finance of the Research System 
in Poland: A Survey of the Opinions of Grant Applicants',  Social Studies of Science, Vol. 
25, EASST Special Issue 
 
Jasinski, Andzej (1994) 'R&D and Innovation in Poland in the Transition Period', 
Economic Systems, Vol.,. 18, No. 2, pp. 117-141. 
 
Jasinski, Andzej  (1995) Academy - Industry Relations in Poland, University of Warsaw, 
(Project: Innovation Potential Embodied in the Changing Academy - Industry Relations, 
Central European University), mimeo 
 
Lauer-Couderc, Marie (1995) The Situation of the Former Research Units in Russia, 
CERNA, Ecoles des Mines, Paris, mimeo 
 
Lenardic, Mira (1994) The Science and Technology in the Transition Economy of 
Croatia: The Changing Academy - Industry Relations: Case Study: "Koncar - 
Technology Park", The Institute of Economics, Zagreb, 1995, (Project: Innovation 
Potential Embodied in the Changing Academy - Industry Relations, Central European 
University), mimeo 
 
Mosoni, Fried, Judith (19950 'Industrial Research In Hungary: A Victim of Structural 
Change', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, EASST Special Issue  
 
Mowery, David (1983) 'The Relationship between intrafirm and contractual forms of 
industrial research in American manufacturing, 1900-1940', Explorations in Economic 
History, Vol. 20, pp. 351-374. 
 
Mowery, David (1990) 'The Changing Structure of US. Industrial Research: Implications 
for R&D Organisation in the Russian Federation', In Glaziev, S. and Schnedier, C., 
Russian R&D in Transition, IIASA, Laxenburg 
 
Muller, Karel (1995) Report on the Academy - Industry Relationship Project in the Czech 
Republic, Institute of Learning Foundations, Charles University, Prague, June 1994. 
(Project: Innovation Potential Embodied in the Changing Academy - Industry Relations, 
Central European University), mimeo 
 
Orel, V. M. (1995) 'Socialno-ekonomicheskie aspekti razvitiya nauyki v Rossii', In Kelle, 
V. Z., E. Z. Mirskaya and S. A. Kugel, et al. Socialnaya dinamika sovremenoy nayki, 
Nayka, Moskva. 
 
Chapter in Webster, Andrew (ed):  Building New Bases for Innovation: The 
Transformation of the R&D System in Post-Socialist States, Anglia Polytechnic 
University, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 8-30. 
 
22 
Radosevic, Slavo (1992) 'Academy - Industry Relations: The Case of Croatia' Paper 
presented at the meeting of eastern European network on S&T policy, Budapest April 13, 
1992.  
 
Radosevic, Slavo  (1994) "National Systems of Innovation in Economies in Transition: 
Between Restructuring and Erosion", Paper presented at the conference 'Research Co-
operation with Countries in Transition' Vienna, Austria, Six Nations Programme, 
December 1-2. 
 
Radosevic, Slavo  (1996) 'Systems of Innovation in Transformation form Socialism to 
Post-Socialism', In Edquist, C. et al (eds.) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, 
Institutions and Organisations, (forthcoming) 
 
Radosevic, Slavo  (1995b) "Science and Technology Capabilities in Economies in 
Transition: Effects and Prospects", The Economics of Transition, Vol. 3(4), December 
1995. 
 
Schneider, Christian (1995) Systemic Transformation and its Impact on Industrial 
Innovation Networks: - The Case of the 'Research-Plc' in eastern Germany, Paper 
presented at the workshop 'Discontinuous institutional change and the economic system: 
theory and evidence', July 8-13, Castel Ivano, Italy, ROSES-CNRS, Paris, mimeo 
 
Schneider, Christian (1996) Post-Socialism and impact of the economic reforms on 
industrial research: A Study of Czech and Slovak research institutes in the 
electrotechnical sector, ROSES-PARIS, mimeo 
 
Simeonova, Kostadinka (1995) Reforms at Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and their 
Impact on Academy - Industry Relations, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, (Project: 
Innovation Potential Embodied in the Changing Academy - Industry Relations, Central 
European University)   
 
Simeonova, Kostadinka (1994) Innovation capacities Embodied in Academy - Industry 
Relations: Bulgarian Case, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, (Project: Innovation 
Potential Embodied in the Changing Academy - Industry Relations, Central European 
University)   
 
Sandu, Steliana (1994) Final report on the Romanian Case Study, Institute of National 
Economy, Romanian Academy, (Project: Innovation Potential Embodied in the Changing 
Academy - Industry Relations, Central European University) 
 
Tambovtsev, V. L. (1995) Spontaneous privatisation in Research Organisations, Studies 
on Russian Economic Development, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 324-328. 
 
Chapter in Webster, Andrew (ed):  Building New Bases for Innovation: The 
Transformation of the R&D System in Post-Socialist States, Anglia Polytechnic 
University, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 8-30. 
 
23 
Teece, D, Dosi, G., Rumelt,R. and Winter, S. (1994) Understanding Corporate 
Coherence: Theory and Evidence,  Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 
Vol. 23, No.1, June 1994, pp. 1- 30. 
  
Tunzelmannn, von Nick (1995) Technology and Industrial Progress, Edward Elgar, 
London 
 
Webster, J. Andrew (1989) Privatisation of public sector research: the case of a plant 
breeding institute, Science and Public Policy, vol. 16, no. 4, August 1989, pp. 224-232. 
 
Wolf, Hans-Georg  (1995) 'An Academy in Transition: Organisational Success and 
Failure in the Process of German Unification', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, EASST 
Special Issue 
 
